{"id":2686,"date":"2017-07-21T13:47:48","date_gmt":"2017-07-21T03:47:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/?p=2686"},"modified":"2017-07-21T13:47:48","modified_gmt":"2017-07-21T03:47:48","slug":"spyware-merchants-the-risks-of-outsourcing-government-hacking","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/2017\/07\/21\/spyware-merchants-the-risks-of-outsourcing-government-hacking\/","title":{"rendered":"Spyware merchants: the risks of outsourcing government hacking"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>This post authored by<a href=\"http:\/\/staff.qut.edu.au\/staff\/mannm3\">\u00a0Dr. Monique Mann\u00a0<\/a>(CJRC),\u00a0Dr Adam Molnar and Dr Ian Warren (Deakin Criminology)\u00a0originally appeared on The Conversation on Friday the 21st of July 2017. Link to original article here:\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/spyware-merchants-the-risks-of-outsourcing-government-hacking-80891\">https:\/\/theconversation.com\/spyware-merchants-the-risks-of-outsourcing-government-hacking-80891<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/files\/2016\/08\/479d56e460e9bf4b255aa25b1b193563-bpfull.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-1827\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/files\/2016\/08\/479d56e460e9bf4b255aa25b1b193563-bpfull.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>An Australian Tax Office (ATO) staffer <a href=\"http:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2017-07-12\/tax-office-slip-up-reveals-new-phone-hacking-capabilities\/8698800\">recently leaked<\/a> on LinkedIn a step-by-step guide to hacking a smartphone.<\/p>\n<p>The documents, which have since been removed, indicate that the ATO has access to Universal Forensic Extraction software made by the Israeli company Cellebrite. This technology is part of a commercial industry that profits from bypassing the security features of devices to gain access to private data.<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>The ATO <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ato.gov.au\/Media-centre\/Media-releases\/Second-Commissioner-s-Statement--ATO-digital-forensic-capability\/\">later stated<\/a> that while it does use these methods to aid criminal investigations, it \u201cdoes not monitor taxpayers\u2019 mobile phones or remotely access their mobile devices\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, the distribution of commercial spyware to government agencies appears to be common practice in Australia.<\/p>\n<p>This is generally considered to be lawful surveillance. But without proper oversight, there are serious risks to the proliferation of these tools, here and around the world.<\/p>\n<h2>The dangers of the spyware market<\/h2>\n<p>The spyware market is estimated to be worth <a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/thomasbrewster\/2017\/02\/16\/government-iphone-android-spyware-is-the-same-as-seedy-spouseware\/#2e300813455c\">millions of dollars globally<\/a>. And as Canadian privacy research group Citizen Lab <a href=\"https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/2017\/03\/whos-watching-little-brother-checklist-accountability-industry-behind-government-hacking\/\">has noted<\/a>, spyware vendors have been willing to sell their wares to autocratic governments.<\/p>\n<p>There are numerous examples of spyware being used by states with dubious human-rights records. These include the surveillance of journalists, political opponents and human rights advocates, including more recently by the <a href=\"https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/2017\/06\/reckless-exploit-mexico-nso\/\">Mexican government<\/a> and in the <a href=\"https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/2016\/08\/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae\/\">United Arab Emirates<\/a>. In Bahrain, the tools have reportedly been used to <a href=\"https:\/\/theintercept.com\/2016\/12\/08\/phone-cracking-cellebrite-software-used-to-prosecute-tortured-dissident\/\">silence political dissent<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>A rally in support of Apple\u2019s refusal to help the FBI access the cell phone of a gunman involved in the killings of 14 people in San Bernardino, in Santa Monica, California, United States. <a href=\"http:\/\/pictures.reuters.com\/C.aspx?VP3=SearchResult&amp;VBID=2C0BXZWK3GU8J&amp;SMLS=1&amp;RW=1920&amp;RH=962#\/SearchResult&amp;VBID=2C0BXZWK3GU8J&amp;SMLS=1&amp;RW=1920&amp;RH=962&amp;POPUPPN=11&amp;POPUPIID=2C0BF1FBTIFP6\">REUTERS\/Lucy Nicholson<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Commercial spyware often steps in when mainstream technology companies resist cooperating with law enforcement because of security concerns.<\/p>\n<p>In 2016, for example, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/customer-letter\/\">Apple refused<\/a> to assist the FBI in circumventing the security features of an iPhone. Apple claimed that being forced to redesign their products could undermine the security and privacy of all iPhone users.<\/p>\n<p>The FBI eventually dropped its case against Apple, and it was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/technology\/2016\/apr\/21\/fbi-apple-iphone-hack-san-bernardino-price-paid\">later reported<\/a> the FBI paid almost US$1.3 million to a spyware company, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-apple-encryption-cellebrite-idUSKCN0WP17J\">reportedly Cellebrite<\/a>, for technology to hack the device instead. This has never been officially confirmed.<\/p>\n<p>For its part, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cellebrite.com\/Mobile-Forensics\/News-Events\/Press-Releases\/cellebrite-announces-availability-of-mobile-device-forensics-solutions-through-federal-government-wide-procurement-vehicles\">Cellebrite<\/a> claims on its website to provide technologies allowing \u201cinvestigators to quickly extract, decode, analyse and share evidence from mobile devices\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Its services are \u201cwidely used by federal government customers\u201d, it adds.<\/p>\n<h2>Spyware merchants and the Australian Government<\/h2>\n<p>The Australian government has shown considerable appetite for spyware.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.tenders.gov.au\/?event=public.advancedsearch.keyword&amp;keyword=Cellebrite\">Tender records<\/a> show Cellebrite currently holds Australian government contracts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. But the specific details of these contracts remain unclear.<\/p>\n<p>Fairfax Media <a href=\"http:\/\/www.canberratimes.com.au\/national\/asic-ato-afp-and-defence-buy-services-of-phonehacking-company-cellebrite-20170622-gwwbnb.html\">has reported<\/a> that the ATO, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Department of Employment , Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Department of Defence all have contracts with Cellebrite.<\/p>\n<p>The Department of Human Services <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tenders.gov.au\/?event=public.cn.view&amp;CNUUID=07C42438-B724-7039-1F98A5667818BBA6\">has had<\/a> a contract with Cellebrite, and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.canberratimes.com.au\/national\/centrelink-hacking-into-fraudsters-phones-20170627-gwzgqc.html\">Centrelink<\/a> apparently uses spyware to hack the phones of suspected welfare frauds.<\/p>\n<p>In 2015 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2015-07-28\/wikileaks-reveals-australian-companies-selling-spyware\/6652184\">WikiLeaks released emails<\/a> from Hacking Team, an Italian spyware company. These documents revealed <a href=\"http:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2015-07-10\/leaked-emails-expose-australian-government-agencies-hacking-team\/6609276\">negotiations with<\/a> the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the AFP and other law enforcement agencies.<\/p>\n<h2>Laws and licensing<\/h2>\n<p>In Australia, the legality of spyware use varies according to government agency.<\/p>\n<p>Digital forensics tools are used with a warrant by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ato.gov.au\/About-ATO\/Access,-accountability-and-reporting\/In-detail\/Our-approach-to-information-gathering\/?page=2#Legislative_references\">the ATO<\/a> to conduct federal criminal investigations. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.austlii.edu.au\/au\/legis\/cth\/consol_act\/ca191482\/s3e.html\">A warrant<\/a> is typically required before Australian police agencies can use spyware.<\/p>\n<p>ASIO, on the other hand, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.austlii.edu.au\/au\/legis\/cth\/consol_act\/asioa1979472\/\">has its own powers<\/a>, and those under the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.austlii.edu.au\/au\/legis\/cth\/consol_act\/taaa1979410\/\">Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979<\/a>, that enable spyware use when authorised by the attorney-general.<\/p>\n<p>ASIO also has <a href=\"http:\/\/www.austlii.edu.au\/au\/legis\/cth\/consol_act\/asioa1979472\/s25a.html\">expanded powers<\/a> to hack <a href=\"https:\/\/policyreview.info\/articles\/analysis\/computer-network-operations-and-rule-law-australia\">phones and computer networks<\/a>. These powers raise concerns about the adequacy of independent oversight.<\/p>\n<p>Centrelink is using the services of spyware company, Cellebrite. <a href=\"http:\/\/one.aap.com.au\/#\/search\/centrelink?q=%7B%22pageSize%22:25,%22pageNumber%22:2%7D\">AAP Image\/Dan Peled<\/a><\/p>\n<p>International control of these tools is also being considered.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.wassenaar.org\/\">Wassenaar Arrangement<\/a>, of which Australia is participant, is an international export control regime that aims to limit the movement of goods and technologies that can be used for both military and civilian purposes.<\/p>\n<p>But there are questions about whether this agreement can be enforced. Security experts also question whether it could criminalise <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2015\/06\/arms-control-pact-security-experts-arms\/\">some forms of cybersecurity research<\/a> and limit the exchange of important <a href=\"https:\/\/www.privacyinternational.org\/node\/344\">encryption technology<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Australia has export <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defence.gov.au\/ExportControls\/DTC.asp\">control laws<\/a> that apply <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defence.gov.au\/ExportControls\/ICT.asp#Overview\">to intrusion software<\/a>, but the process lacks transparency about the domestic export of spyware technologies to overseas governments. Currently, there are few import controls.<\/p>\n<p>There are also moves to regulate spyware through licensing schemes. For example, Singapore is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csa.gov.sg\/news\/press-releases\/mci-and-csa-seek-public-feedback-on-proposed-cybersecurity-bill\">considering<\/a> a license for ethical hackers. This could potentially improve transparency and control of the sale of intrusion software.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s also concerning that \u201coff-the-shelf\u201d spyware is <a href=\"https:\/\/motherboard.vice.com\/en_us\/article\/aeyea8\/i-tracked-myself-with-dollar170-smartphone-spyware-that-anyone-can-buy\">readily accessible<\/a> to the public.<\/p>\n<h2>\u2018War on math\u2019 and government hacking<\/h2>\n<p>The use of spyware in Australia should be viewed alongside the recent announcement of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull\u2019s so-called <a href=\"http:\/\/www.zdnet.com\/article\/labor-not-distancing-itself-from-turnbulls-war-on-maths\/\">war on maths<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The prime minister has <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/australias-planned-decryption-law-would-weaken-cybersecurity-81028\">announced laws<\/a> will be introduced obliging technology companies to intercept encrypted communications to fight terrorism and other crimes.<\/p>\n<p>This is part of a general appetite to undermine security features that are designed to provide the public at large with privacy and safety when using smartphones and other devices.<\/p>\n<p>Despite the prime minister\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.computerworld.com.au\/article\/620329\/no-one-talking-about-backdoors-says-pm-cyber-guy\/\">statements to the contrary<\/a>, these policies can\u2019t help but force technology companies to build <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theregister.co.uk\/2017\/07\/07\/oz_governments_definition_of_backdoor\/\">backdoors<\/a> into, or otherwise weaken or undermine, encrypted messaging services and the security of the hardware itself.<\/p>\n<p>While the government tries to bypass encryption, spyware technologies already rely on the inherent weaknesses of our digital ecosystem. This is a secretive, lucrative and unregulated industry with serious potential for abuse.<\/p>\n<p>There needs to be more transparency, oversight and strong steps toward developing a robust framework of <a href=\"https:\/\/citizenlab.ca\/2017\/03\/whos-watching-little-brother-checklist-accountability-industry-behind-government-hacking\/\">accountability<\/a> for both the government and private spyware companies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This post authored by\u00a0Dr. Monique Mann\u00a0(CJRC),\u00a0Dr Adam Molnar and Dr Ian Warren (Deakin Criminology)\u00a0originally appeared on The Conversation on Friday the 21st of July 2017. Link to original article here:\u00a0https:\/\/theconversation.com\/spyware-merchants-the-risks-of-outsourcing-government-hacking-80891 An Australian Tax Office (ATO) staffer recently leaked on LinkedIn a step-by-step guide to hacking a smartphone. The documents, which have since been removed, indicate<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4341,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-2686","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-uncategorized"},"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2686","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4341"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2686"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2686\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2687,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2686\/revisions\/2687"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2686"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2686"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qut.edu.au\/crime-and-justice-research-centre\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2686"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}